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JURISDICTION 
This Court has no jurisdiction of this appeal. 
The validity or constitutionality of a statute was not 
raised in either the justice court or the circuit court and 
the decision of the circuit court is therefore final. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1* Does the Utah Court of Appeals have 
jurisdiction over an appeal from a circuit court affirmance 
of a justice court judgment, where the validity or 
constitutionality of a statute was raised in neither lower 
Court? 
2. Is it a crime for an individual without a 
Utah driver's license to drive in Utah while his operating 
privileges in the state have been suspended? 
3. Can Utah suspend the right of the holder of a 
Wyoming license certificate, whose residence is unknown, to 
operate a motor vehicle in the State of Utah? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
Interpretation of the following constitutional 
provisions and statutes is determinative of this case: 
Constitutional Provisions 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in 
each State to the public Acts, Records 
and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State. 
2 
U. S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 1. 
The Citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities 
in the several States. 
U. S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, cl. 1. 
Statutes 
A person whose operator's license has 
been suspended or revoked, as provided in 
this act, and who drives any motor 
vehicle upon the highways of this state 
while that license is suspended or 
revoked, is guilty of a crime, and upon 
conviction shall be punished as provided 
for in Section 41-2-30. 
Section 41-2-28, Utah Code (1985). 
"License" means the privilege to operate a 
motor vehicle over the highways of this state. 
Section 41-2-l(n), Utah Code (1985). 
The case shall be tried anew in the 
circuit court and the decision of the 
circuit court is final except where the 
validity or constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance is raised in the 
justice court. 
Section 77-35-26(13)(a), Utah Code (1988). 
Except as expressly required by 
provisions of this compact, nothing 
contained herein shall be construed to 
affect the right of any party state to 
apply any of its other laws relating to 
licenses to drive to any person or 
circumstance . . . . 
Article VI, Driver's License Compact, Section 41-2-502, Utah 
Code (1987). 
The following is the procedure of the 
issuing jurisdiction: 
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(1) When issuing a citation for a 
traffic violation, a peace officer shall 
issue the citation to a motorist who 
possesses a driver license issued by a 
party jurisdiction and shall not . . . 
require the motorist to post collateral 
to secure appearance if the officer 
receives the motorist's personal 
recognizance that he or she will comply 
with the terms of the citation. 
(3) Upon failure of a motorist to comply 
with the terms of a traffic citation, the 
appropriate official shall report the 
failure to comply to the licensing 
authority of the jurisdiction in which 
the traffic citation was issued. . . . 
(5) The licensing authority of the 
issuing jurisdiction may not suspend the 
privilege of a motorist for whom a report 
has been transmitted. 
Nonresident Violator Compact, Section 41-2-603, Utah Code 
(1987) 
(b) Upon receipt of certification that 
the driving privilege of a resident of 
this state has been suspended or revoked 
in any other state pursuant to a law 
providing for its suspension or 
revocation for failure to deposit 
security for the payment of judgments 
arising out of a motor vehicle accident; 
or for failure to deposit both security 
and proof of financial responsibility, 
under circumstances which would require 
the division to suspend a nonresident's 
operating privilege had the accident 
occurred in this state, the division 
shall suspend the license of the resident 
and all of his registrations. Suspension 
shall continue until the resident 
furnishes evidence of his compliance with 
the law of the other state relating to 
the deposit of security and until the 
resident files proof of financial 
responsibility if required by the law. 
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Section 31-9-204, Wyoming Statutes (1973). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the Judgment and Order of 
Probation entered in the Twelfth (now Seventh) Circuit Court 
of San Juan County, Utah, Honorable Bruce K. Halliday 
presiding, on April 21, 1988, after a trial on March 31, 
1988. Defendant and appellant Lee Hatfield Christensen 
(f,Christensenff) was convicted of violating an ordinance of 
the City of Monticello (the "City") adopting Section 41-2-
28, Utah Code (1985J1 on September 3, 1987, by driving a 
motor vehicle within the City while his license was 
suspended or revoked. Christensen had appealed from a 
conviction for the same offense before the Monticello 
Justice of the Peace. 
The City moved for summary disposition of this 
appeal after defendant filed his docketing statement because 
the validity or constitutionality of the statute was not 
raised in the justice court. That motion was deferred by 
the court until after filing of the briefs. 
This Court referred the question of Christensen1s 
1At the time of the violation, the City had adopted the Utah 
Traffic Laws in effect in 1985. Though Christensen was 
technically convicted of violating the City Ordinance, this brief 
will refer to the statutes incorporated by the City's ordinance. 
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impecuniosity to the Circuit Court, which decided that 
Christensen is not impecunious. Christensen filed numerous 
papers with this Court and the Circuit Court, including 
notices of appeal from orders of a clearly interlocutory 
nature, and a petition for writ of mandamus, which was 
denied, but has not appealed from the final order of the 
Circuit Court determining that he is not impecunious. 
Christensen1s brief does not contain a certificate 
of mailing stating that it was mailed or served on or before 
December 17, 1988, and the envelope in which the City's 
copies were received bears a postmark of December 20, 1988. 
The City hereby moves for dismissal of the appeal pursuant 
to Rule 26(2), R. Utah Ct. App. (1988) because of 
Christensen1s failure to file his brief by December 17, 
1988. 
Statement of Facts 
The City does not agree with Christensen's 
Statement of Facts. Christensen has not furnished a 
transcript of the proceedings in the Circuit Court and his 
assertions in his brief are not evidence. 
The City does agree that the document attached as 
Exhibit B to Christensen1s brief was introduced as evidence 
at the trial. That document shows that Christensen1s 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah was suspended 
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for one year on February 5, 1987. The City also introduced 
uncontested evidence that Christensen was driving within the 
City on September 3, 1987. Christensen, however, did not 
testify, nor did he call any witnesses. He was permitted to 
introduce a copy of his Wyoming driving record, which showed 
that he had been issued a Wyoming license certificate. 
There is no evidence in the record that 
Christensen is or was, on September 3, 1987, a resident of 
Wyoming. Christensen introduced no such evidence at trial. 
The City does not believe that Christensen is or was a 
resident of Wyoming. In all proceedings in this Court and 
below, he has listed an address in Wyoming of 225 Hwy 30 
East, Evanston, Wyoming, but has asked that all mail be sent 
to him in care of his father, Norman Christensen, at 965 
South 15th East, in Salt Lake City, Utah. Every notice, 
paper, or pleading sent to his address in Wyoming was 
returned marked "addressee unknown" and the owners of the 
recreational vehicle court at that location finally told the 
City that three years of records did not show that 
Christensen had ever stayed there, that he was unknown to 
them, and that the City should stop sending mail to that 
address. 
There is no evidence in the record that 
Christensen challenged the validity or constitutionality of 
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a statute in the justice court. His brief maintains that he 
did, but there is no transcript showing that he raised the 
issue in either lower court. Counsel for the City recalls 
no such challenge in either lower court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is an appeal that should never have been 
filed. The validity or constitutionality of a statute was 
not raised in either lower Court, thus depriving this Court 
of jurisdiction. Even in this court, Christensen's 
constitutional arguments are raised only pro forma. The 
thrust of his argument is one of statutory interpretation. 
Assuming that the merits of Christensen's arguments are 
addressed, they should be rejected. The State of Utah has 
the right to suspend the license or privilege of any person 
to drive within the State of Utah and properly did so in 
this case. Christensen1s Wyoming license certificate, if 
valid at all, is not valid as against such a suspension. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION. 
Section 77-35-26(13), Utah Code (1988) provides 
that where an appeal is taken to the circuit court from a 
judgment rendered in justice court: 
[T]he decision of the circuit court is final 
except where the validity or 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance 
is raised in the justice court. 
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Christensen contends that he challenged the 
validity * " ~onrt : --•" : :nn ] it" -*f stdLu-- ;n ' :.'. * s 
content:' The record .. dcvond o* any such evidencer . »t 
J * 
In both the justi ce court and the circuit court,, 
Christensen ::::] a :i me ::i II ) tt la t s ii :i Ill ;; suspended 
.1*0 driving privilege, he couid ::cr~ ue c;jnvicted or :::V,-T 
with a suspended license, in ' ~;:nce h-° hsd - Vyom ug 
Jta, -:J ujd i ciaim cnat '.:-. statutes under w m e n r:c- -is 
appi't as he 
holder •: Vyoming license cert itirat--. o-e; . . •: 
CouiL, ^r'.^^^r^r^''- •; * rument that fc hr- -"••* :- • v ;> - 1 
h e was j : . a ^ - ; J . - .;*•,.***« o r u n c o n s ^ i ^ u j i i d i * ^ . . m . ^ a 
i n a p r o f o r m a w a y , and ;;: s u p p o r t e d b y no a u t h o r i t y . 
±^. CHRISTENSEN ^ , v i 2 IN UTAH WHILi- "" 
LICENSE TO DO SO WAS SUSPENDED 
C h r i s t e n s e n 1: e I i e s :> n a 1 2 1:1 e c • f ::i a I: :i, e r 
jurisdictions holding that a 1: 101 1 -i esidei 1 t whose operating 
privileges have been revoked cannot be convicted of driving 
9 
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on a suspended license. This reliance is misplaced. 
Nebraska v. Reeder involved a driver whose license was 
suspended by Nebraska for one year on April 12, 1968. On 
May 6, 1969, after moving to Colorado and after his Nebraska 
suspension had expired, he obtained a Colorado license. The 
Court held that the Colorado license entitled him to drive 
in Nebraska. Even assuming that Christensen was a bona fide 
resident of Wyoming, his period of suspension had not ended 
when he drove again in Utah. 
In New Hampshire v. French, the driver, a resident 
of New York, was convicted of driving under the influence 
and her right to operate a vehicle in New Hampshire was 
revoked for 90 days. The Court held that she could not be 
convicted of driving while her license was revoked because 
her New York license was not revoked, only her right to 
operate in New Hampshire. The Court noted: 
Other states have statutes . . . proscribing 
only driving after suspension or revocation 
of one's license, but . . . defin[e] license 
to include f,any non resident operating 
privilege." Our legislature may draft a 
statute similar or identical to the ones 
above in order to cover cases like the one 
before us. The judiciary may not. 
2Indiana v. Churchill, 180 Ind. App. 349, 388 N.E.2d 586 
(1979); New Hampshire v. French, 117 N.H. 785, 378 A.2d 1377 
(1977); Nebraska v. Reeder, 188 Neb. 121, 195 N.W.2d 509 (1972) 
3New Hampshire v. French, 117 N.H. 785 at 788, 378 A.2d 1377 
(1977). 
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The 'Jz.ir: . - j a i s L i r n r ? h ^ s ^r - .^^^a sir:n 
Z('^ , Utah Code (1988) defines license as "tine privileae 
cc. ccerate a motor Trohicic in ih±3 r-^^ - So^^\on -•- - -
can :.nus be resiauca -J sav thar -* 
operate a motor vehicle In this state has been suspended or 
v-c. /- -<.ri.- r 3 nd who :iri ves any motor vehicle 1 ipon the highways 
• : '.r.io state is guilty of a crime. 
Indiana v. Churchill draws a similar distinction 
between license and privilege , a :i :i s t i i ic t :i on \ ; 1 i :i ::! i the IJta h 
Legislature abolished. 
The rule of ] aw applicable to this case Is stated 
:wi:iit:^ : _^: , Roy i 23 Coi n I. Si ij: f • i 1! i 6 i 2 :il 66 ( C :)nn. 
A pp 1961}: 
Donald Roy, Massachusetts operator, by virtue 
of §14-39 is entitled to the rights and 
privileges accorded to Donald J, Roy, 
Connecticut operator, a person whose right to 
: ]:: >erate a motor vehicle in Connecticut has 
been suspended. Equivalent right does not 
mean additional right, and the provisions of 
§14-39 were not intended to be, and cannot 
be, used as a back door means of obtaining 
restoration of a suspended license. 
^Connecticut v. Roy, 23 Conn. Supp. 26, 1 76 A.2d 66 at 68 
(Conn. App. 1961) 
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III. CHRISTENSENfS UTAH LICENSE WAS PROPERLY 
SUSPENDED. 
Christensen asserts that Utah has no power to 
suspend his license and that only Wyoming may do so. 
Assuming for purposes of argument that Christensen was and 
is a Wyoming resident, a proposition that the City considers 
very unlikely, Utah is nevertheless entitled to suspend 
whatever license or privilege Christensen may have to 
operate in Utah under his Wyoming license certificate. 
The very Wyoming statutes cited by Christensen in 
his brief and included in his addendum show that Wyoming 
recognizes the rights of other states to suspend the 
privileges of Wyoming residents and license holders to drive 
in those other states. Section 31-9-204, Wyoming Statutes 
(1973) requires Wyoming to take measures to suspend the 
license of a Wyoming resident whose privilege to drive in 
another state is suspended for failure to deposit security, 
precisely the situation in this case. 
Christensen cites the Drivers1 License Compact, 
Sections 41-2-501 et seq., Utah Code (1988) and the 
Nonresident Violator Compact, Sections 41-2-601 et seq., 
Utah Code (1988) for the proposition that this Wyoming 
license certificate authorizes him to drive in Utah until 
and unless Wyoming revokes or suspends his license. 
However, nothing in the Drivers' License Compact declares 
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that Utah may not suspend or revoke nonresident operator 
privileges. Furthermore, the Drivers' License Compact 
specifically provides In Article VT that "nothing contained 
herein shall -i^ f'-^ t Hi** Mont of any party state to 
apply any of its other laws relating1 to licenses to drive to 
any person or circumstance . . . . ' ! 
Chrisr-rns-nr .-•->- ::ts tl 1, it Sect: i • >n 4 3 2 603 ( 5) : )f • 
the Nonresident Violator Compact: bars Utah from, suspending 
his license However, a reading of the entire section ^aKes 
c l d i : Li.a - ... OLL: : r-.: :; •.;•-.: 
motorist has not complied vith *. no -erms or a uiarfic 
citation, "In ither woros. • impact state may net -uspend 
triL a i , .' „:.~ L I .. \ ^ ...• . - • , . •: :; 
to appear in response re a citation oui: -rust _nstead report 
to the jurisdiction c: residence M i ~n vi ! 1 ^riate ex 
suspension acti- :: -JC _.. •. ..--
suspensions for vieiatien of traffic laws, 
nhristenson asserts thi" ^iMier the I J", S, • :>i: 
W y o m i n g . : L S : : ; . O . : - ; ; : S ... j ^ u ^ t . ... -hi Stat/i ite Tl le 
Wyoming Constitution clearly applies cni,r to Wyoming and can 
have no or feet on che vaj-iditv -*r const: • o*~ tcnality of Utah 
laws. ^nristensen cites no =ut:::i-L" ; ' . -^ claim h-r. u 
"full faun -no credit'1 ' u:d "privileges and immunities"' 
Art ic1e IV, S e c t i on 1 
clauses of the U. S. Constitution prevent Utah from 
suspending the licenses of nonresidents for failure to 
comply with Utah traffic laws. Both provisions prohibit 
Utah from discriminating against residents of other states, 
just because they reside elsewhere. They do not prevent 
Utah from enforcing non-discriminatory traffic laws against 
all persons using its highways. 
CONCLUSION 
Christensenfs statutory interpretation arguments 
are raised now for the third time. His constitutional 
arguments are raised for the first time. He has relied on a 
Wyoming license certificate without any evidence that he 
resides or resided in Wyoming. In fact, it seems quite 
clear that his actual resident is in Utah. He has subjected 
this Court to a deluge of paper and the City to substantial 
legal expense. His conviction should be affirmed and double 
costs, including attorney's fees, awarded under Rule 33. 
DATED this /T/A day of January, 1989. 
L .Robert Anderson 
Lyle R. Anderson 
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C. 
Attorneys for City 
P. 0. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Article IV, Section 2, cl. 1 
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